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An Inquiry into Development of the Science and Technology

Parks in China
1． Introduction
It is widely recognized that science and technology parks are effective vehicles for promoting new technology-oriented firms, facilitating the commercialization of scientific research, and revitalizing regional economies (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002; Link and Scott, 2003) . Since the late 1980s, the Chinese government has been promoting the formation and development of national science and technology industrial parks (STIPs). There has been increasing interest in similar policy in other developing countries. However, the argument that science parks are effective in realizing the previously mentioned roles is not unanimously accepted by all researchers, and some critics in fact consider them to be "high-tech fantasies" (Macdonald, 1987; Massey et al., 1992; Bakouros, Marda, and Varsakelis, 2002) .
Similar concerns exist in China as well. Cao (2004) , Macdonald and Deng (2004), and Hu (2007) , for example, question whether the STIPs have successfully fostered the on-park firms' innovation capability and the development of the regional economy. The on-park firms have been given a variety of preferential treatments by the government. For example, these firms have been provided tax exemptions, which were not given to the high-tech firms outside the STIPs until April 2008. The
STIPs occupy large areas in large cities, which are now becoming congested.
Questions arise as to whether the STIPs deserve such support and how the STIP policy can be improved.
This study uses data on high-tech firms within and outside the STIPs in China to investigate further the effectiveness of the STIPs, while paying special attention to the issues related to agglomeration economies and congestion problems. Concentrating the location of high-tech firms within the STIPs would help the government provide them with physical infrastructure and business support efficiently. According to the spatial economics literature (e.g., Fujita and Thisse 2002) , the agglomeration of firms facilitates knowledge spillovers, the development of the division of labor, and the formation of skilled-labor markets. Since the STIPs are agglomerations of high-tech firms, they may well generate and enjoy such agglomeration economies. Moreover, synergies may be created between the STIPs and academic institutions in the same neighborhood and contribute to the development of the high-tech sector of the economy. However, agglomeration tends to be accompanied by congestion, which exerts negative effects on the activities within the agglomeration. If agglomeration economies outweigh congestion effects in the STIPs, preferential treatment and other supports given by the government to the on-park firms are easily justified. If congestion effects prove significant, however, the policy should be reformulated so that the space and infrastructure of the STIPs are used more effectively. For example, efficiency in resource allocation will be improved by replacing the on-park firms benefiting little from agglomeration economies with those which would benefit more.
Data on individual high-tech firms within and outside the national STIPs are unavailable. The data used in this study are aggregated to the STIP level for the on-park firms and to the city level for the off-park high-tech firms. For this reason, our empirical analysis falls short of the identification of the agglomeration economies and congestion effects. Suggestive evidence, however, is obtained by estimating the production elasticities of private capital and labor inputs as well as the productivity effects of past R&D expenditures and spillovers from universities and foreign ventures in the same city, separately for on-and off-park firms. The main finding is that congestion effects are highly likely to be stronger than agglomeration economies within the STIPs, whereas there is no evidence for congestion effects or agglomeration economies among high-tech firms outside the STIPs. Hu (2007) uses the data on 53 national STIPs and finds among other things that agglomeration has no dynamic effects contributing to productivity growth in the STIPs. Our study reinforces Hu's study with a comparison of the STIPs and the high-tech sector outside the STIPs and with an investigation into the congestion effects and static agglomeration economies.
The next section describes the development process of the STIPs in China.
Based on the literature on agglomeration economies and congestion issues, Section 3 develops a conceptual framework that guides the empirical inquiry, which is presented in Section 4. A summary of the findings and the policy implications are contained in Section 5.
Development of STIPs
The first national science and technology industrial park in China is the Beijing Zhongguancun STIP, which was approved by the Chinese State Council in 1988, For a firm to gain entry into the STIPs, it is required to be qualified as a high-tech firm. In China, there are certain criteria for qualifying as a high-tech firm.
First, a high-tech firm is required to develop or use technology in the new and
high-tech products or services listed in the Catalog for High and New Technology
Products published by the Ministry of Science and Technology, such as electronics and information technology, aerospace technology, and biotechnology. Second, a high-tech firm is required to spend at least 3% of its annual gross revenue on Research and Development (R&D) to develop products or services. Third, of the high-tech firm's employees, 30% or more must have at least a college degree, and at least 10% must be engaged in R&D. Finally, a high-tech firm must be certified every year by a provincial-level government agency in charge of science and technology issues.
Failure to meet these conditions disqualifies the firm from enjoying various policy incentives given to high-tech firms. Note that a high-tech firm does not have to be research-oriented. High-tech firms are mostly manufacturers.
High-tech firms are not necessarily located in the national STIPs. Many of them are located outside the national STIPs. In this paper, we refer to those high-tech firms in the national STIPs as on-park firms and those outside the STIPs as off-park firms. According to the Statistics Report of the China Torch High Technology Industry Development Center (hereinafter the Torch Center), there were 43,249 high-tech firms in China in 2006, and 27,293 were on-park and 15,956 were off-park. While the on-park firms are clustered in STIPs, the off-park firms are scattered. Another important difference is that on-park firms are more favorably treated by the government than off-park firms. For example, on-park firms are exempted from corporate income tax for the first two years and enjoy a favorable tax rate of 15% from the third year on, whereas the normal corporate income tax rate is 25%. Their revenues generated by the use of newly transferred technology are only taxable beyond the first 300,000 yuan (or about US$ 45,000). Import licenses are not demanded by the customs office when they import materials and parts from abroad if the materials and parts are used to produce exports.
The government has given such privileges to on-park firms primarily because when the government started the STIPs, it gave the top priority of the STIP policy to the growth of national STIPs. Indeed, the national STIPs have grown at an astonishing speed. For the 14 years from 1992 to 2006, the annual growth rate of real output value per STIP was more than 40%, average labor productivity grew more than sevenfold, and the number of firms in the STIPs also grew more than seven times. Table 1 Table 2 indicate that while the number of on-park firms is larger than that of the off-park firms, the on-park firms have much smaller employment sizes than the off-park firms. These observations suggest that there is congestion in the national STIPs. Note, however, that the congestion, if any, does not result from free access. On the contrary, the entry into the national STIPs is strictly controlled by the STIP authority, and so is the land allocation to the on-park firms.
The on-park firms are smaller also in terms of revenues, value added, and export value than the off-park firms. But the on-park firms tend to have higher labor productivity than the off-park firms.
1 There seem to be several reasons for the relatively high labor productivity of the on-park firms. Among them is that the on-park firms are more high-tech than the off-park firms, which is reflected in the on-park firms' relatively large R&D expenditure. Another possible reason is that the on-park firms tend to employ highly educated workers, whose salaries are likely to be high, compared with the off-park firms, as shown toward the bottom of Table 2 .
There is more to say about the reasons why the on-park firms tend to have higher labor productivity and smaller sizes, as will be discussed in detail below.
Framework of empirical inquiry
Agglomeration economies
Our analysis begins by formulating a production function that can accommodate agglomeration economies, congestion, and other possible sources of productivity changes. Jacobs (1969) argues that the scale and diversity of large cities allow firms in different sectors to benefit from the cross-fertilization of ideas. Agglomeration economies have been discussed in the literature on trade, urban economics, and economic geography as well as growth theory (e.g., Helpman, 1984; Henderson 1988; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999; Romer, 1986) . We borrow the following production function from the international trade literature with a slight modification: 
If the firms in the same group face the same output price and the same factor prices, and if they are price takers, they will choose the same factor proportions and, hence, ΣF(v) in the most right-hand side of equation (2) can be written as F(V) where V is the aggregate input vector Σ v, so that we have
If the function h(Y) has a constant elasticity, ε, or more specifically, h(Y) = AY ε , rearranging equation (3) yields
Since the aggregate production function (4) is homogenous of degree 1/(1 -ε), the function exhibits constant returns to scale if ε = 0, and increasing returns to scale (IRS) if 0 < ε < 1. Note that the existence of IRS is consistent with the assumption that firms are price takers, since IRS are external in this model.
Congestion effect
Following the lead of Aschauer (1989 ), Holtz-Eakin (1994 , and other studies on the productivity effects of public-sector capital, we assume that the input vector v has three elements: private capital input k, labor input l, and a composite input of land and infrastructure g. Suppose that land represented by g is rented freely at the real rental price ρ (i.e., ρ is the nominal price divided by the output price), as long as g does not exceed an upper limit γ . Suppose that k and l are temporarily fixed for some reasons, such as financial constraints and skilled worker shortage. The firm's profit maximization conditional on k, l, and γ is written as
The inner solution g (ρ, Y, k, l) is increasing in Y, k, and l and decreasing in ρ.
Substituting this conditional demand function for g in the production function yields
This is the production function when constraint (5) 
is unbinding. It is easy to show that H(ρ, Y, k, l) is homogeneous of degree 1 with respect to k and l. If g(ρ, Y, k, l) >
γ , then the quantity of g that is actually used has to be bound to γ and the output is given by
The production function (7) exhibits decreasing returns to k and l.
The STIPs control the number of on-park firms and land allocation. How does congestion take place in an STIP? As the number of firms increases in the STIP, the aggregate output Y increases, which contributes to the productivity of individual firms through an increase in h(Y), leading to an increase in the demand for g. The STIP authority, however, may not be able to increase γ accordingly, because it accommodates a greater number of firms than before. On the contrary, newcomers may be allocated smaller γ. Moreover, to the extent that on-park firms share infrastructure which is a common property, an increase in the number of on-park firms will decrease the allocation of composite γ of land and infrastructure, leading to a congestion problem.
Diagnosis and caveats
When congestion is a problem, the aggregate production function (4) is written
where upper case letters are used for aggregate variables. If F is of the generalized Cobb-Douglas function, the expression (8) reduces to
When congestion is not a problem, the counterpart is
Let the production elasticities with respect to private capital input and labor input be a and b, respectively. From production functions (9) and (10), it follows that if there are both external IRS (i.e., ε > 0) and congestion (i.e., g = γ ), a + b is equal to (α + β)/(1 -ε), which may or may not be greater than unity. If there are external IRS but no congestion, a + b is (α + β)/(α + β -ε), which is definitely greater than unity. If there is congestion but no external IRS, a + b is equal to α + β , which is definitely smaller than unity. If there is neither congestion nor external IRS, a + b is equal to unity. These four cases are summarized in Table 3 .
Suppose that it is possible to obtain an unbiased estimate of a + b. With this estimate, can we identify which cell of the matrix in Table 3 unlikely that fixed inputs other than land and infrastructure are important only for the on-park firms. Thus, the comparison makes it more plausible that a + b being smaller than unity indicates the existence of congestion.
The third reason why the reliable estimate of a + b does not provide conclusive evidence is that (α + β)/(1 -ε) in the north-west cell of the matrix in Table 3 may be greater or smaller than unity. Because of this ambiguity, one cannot conclude that there is no congestion (or no other fixed input problem) when a + b is found to be greater than unity. To reduce ambiguity, it is useful to find variables that are closely correlated with productivity and then examine the relationship between these variables and firm size. To see how such variables work, suppose that an increase in a variable, say Z, is found to increase productivity A but not increase employment L significantly.
Since employment size can be freely chosen, a significant improvement in productivity is likely to increase employment significantly. If employment does not increase much, then it may be that the increase in employment is constrained by congestion or some other fixed input problems. Thus, the examination of the relationship between Z and employment can offer supplementary information to the estimation of a + b.
Correlates of productivity
A possible Z variable is the scale of research and education activities of local universities, according to studies by Jaffe (1989), Acs, Audretsch, and Feldman (1991) , Mansfield (1995) , and Lynskey (2009) among others. Hu (2007) finds that the effect of this variable on productivity growth is insignificant, but he does not check the variable's effect on productivity level. Another variable that may be a correlate of the productivity A of high-tech firms is the foreign direct investment in their neighborhood. The empirical literature on the spillover effects of foreign direct investment research has not reached a consensus (see, e.g., Cornish, 1997; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Keller and Yeaple, 2003; Todo and Miyamoto, 2006) . However, the studies of foreign direct investment in China tend to support the argument that there are such effects (Chen, Chang, and Zhang, 1995; Ran, Voon, and Li, 2007) .
Moreover, Todo, Zhang and Zhou (2006) find that knowledge spills over from foreign firms' R&D activities to high-tech firms. Similarly, Hu (2007) finds that the productivity growth of the STIP responds positively to the foreign direct investment that its host city receives.
Following Griliches (1979 Griliches ( , 1988 , we consider that a weighted sum of real R&D investment in the past, which we refer to as R&D stock hereafter, is likely to be correlated with productivity A. Jacobs (1969), Glaeser et al. (1992) , and Henderson (2003) among others argue that productivity is improved by the cross-fertilization of diverse ideas, which is particularly active in large and diverse cities. Thus, variables that measure the urban scale and the diversity of industrial structure of the host city for high-tech firms may serve as Z variables.
Regression Analysis
Specification
Using panel data of 49 STIPs and 41 non-STIPs for five years from 2002 to 2006, we estimate the following functions for the STIPs and the non-STIPs separately: and Z denote the same variables as discussed in the previous section.
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Their detailed definitions, means, and standard deviations are provided in Table 4 . Variables u, λ, and e are the unobserved group effect, year effect, and random error, respectively.
We use the per capita form in equation (11) because the estimated coefficient on the second term tells us whether the sum of the production elasticities a + b is greater than unity. In the estimation of equation (11), we are concerned with the endogeneity problem arising from the facts that Γ and ρ, which appear in production functions (9) and (10), are unobservable, and that these unobservable variables are likely to influence employment L. No valid instrumental variable, however, is found in the available data. We hope that the use of the panel-data model estimation method mitigates the estimation bias substantially. As another approach to this issue, we will remove the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (11) In the previous section, we discussed the effects of Z variables on employment L. In equations (11) and (13), however, the dependent variables are ln(L/N) and lnN. We choose this specification because the estimation of the effects of Z on ln(L/N) and lnN gives at least the same information as that on lnL and probably more. As mentioned earlier, vector Z includes five variables. The first is R&D stock, which is a weighted sum of the real R&D investment in the past. R&D investment is likely to have lagged effects, but its effects are subject to obsolescence. Thus, the weight is smaller for the investment in the more remote past as follows:
where I is the annual real R&D investment of all the firms in group i, δ is the annual depreciation rate, and n refers to the number of years for which R&D outcomes remain usable. According to Nadiri and Pruch (1996) , an arbitrary depreciation rate between 10% and 15% is often used to construct R&D stock.
Griliches (1979) finds that the lag structure of the productivity effect of R&D reaches a peak at about the third year. Data on annual R&D investment of the high-tech firms are available only from 1999. In view of this data constraint, our main specification of regression uses the R&D stock variable that includes the lagged R&D investments up to n = 3 and depreciates them at δ = 15%, and the alternative specification for the robustness check uses the stock variable including R&D investments up to n = 5 with an annual depreciation rate of 10%.
The second variable included in vector Z is the stock of the past foreign direct investments that the host city for the high-tech firms in group i received. This variable, denoted by FDI, is constructed by assuming that the productivity effect of the past investment wears off at 15% per year for the first three years and disappears at the end of the third year. We also constructed an alternative FDI measure by applying a depreciation rate of 10% and the truncation at the end of the fifth year.
The third variable included in vector Z is the number of university teachers, UT it , in the host city of group i. This variable is intended to capture the knowledge spillovers from local universities.
The fourth and fifth variables included in vector Z are intended to capture the so-called urbanization economies, which arise from the scale and diversity of urban activities. We use the number of non-agricultural working population, WP it , in the host city of group i as a proxy for city size. To measure the industrial diversity in a city, we use an urban industrial diversity index, following the lead of Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995) . This index is defined by
where E is the number of employees in a two-digit industry m in the host city for group i in year t, and M is the total number of two-digit industries. There are 19 two-digit industries in total, including agriculture, manufacturing, mining, public utility, wholesale and retail, real estate, construction, finance, and education. UID Table 5 presents the estimated labor productivity function (11). The first three columns report the results based on the fixed-effects models, while the next three columns show the results based on the random-effects models. The sample consists of the 49 STIPs in columns (1) and (4), the 41 non-STIP data in columns (2) and (5), and the pooled sample in columns (3) and (6). The pooled sample is used to examine whether the STIPs and non-STIPs differ much in the coefficients, especially the coefficient on L. For this purpose, we add interaction terms to the regressors, multiplying each variable in equation (11) by the dummy variable that is unity for STIPs and zero for non-STIPs.
Estimation results
Columns (3) and (6) report the coefficients on the interaction terms, i.e., the difference in the coefficients.
The estimated sum of the production elasticities with respect to the capital and labor a + b is significantly smaller than unity in columns (1) and (4), but it is almost equal to unity in columns (2) Turning to the coefficients on the Z variables, we focus on the fixed-effects estimates for the STIPs in column (1) since the random-effect estimates are inconsistent in the STIP sample, but for the non-STIPs, we will discuss the random-effects estimates in column (5) as they are consistent according to the result of the Hausman test and more efficient than the fixed-effects estimates. In both columns (1) and (5) into a city may not necessarily be a cause of the relatively high productivity in the city, but the former may be a result of the latter. It is conceivable that the agglomeration of highly productive firms in a city attracts a large inflow of FDI to the city. With our data and specification, it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between FDI and productivity.
The STIP dummy has a positive and highly significant coefficient in column (6), which indicates that the STIPs have higher labor productivity than the non-STIPs with the effects of all the other regressors being controlled for. A possible reason for this result is that the STIP authority is selective in admitting high-tech firms.
Because of the preferential policies in favor of the on-park firms, high-tech firms are attracted to the national STIPs. If the STIP authorities admit high-performing firms into the STIPs selectively, it is no wonder that the STIPs have higher productivity than the non-STIPs if other things are equal. It is likely that the strong negative effect of congestion, as represented by the large negative coefficient on lnL in Table 5 , is made up for by this selection effect, so that the STIPs and the non-STIPs differ only by 21%
in the sample mean of the average labor productivity, as shown in Table 2 .
To check the robustness of these estimation results, the same regressions are run for the two overlapping three- Tables 9 and 10 . These tables look very different from Table 8 . The random-effects model is inconsistent for the STIPs and consistent for the non-STIPs according to Table 8 , but it is consistent in Table 9 for both the STIPs and non-STIPs and inconsistent in Table 10 for both samples. The STIPs with high levels of R&D, FDI, and UP tend to have high productivity according to Table 8 , but they have neither large employment sizes nor a large number of on-park firms according to Tables 9 and 10 . These contrasting results are consistent with the view that because of congestion, the STIPs cannot take advantage of productivity gains from R&D and knowledge spillovers by increasing firm sizes and the number of on-park firms.
According to columns (2) and (5) of Table 9 and column (2) of Table 10 , the R&D and FDI are positively correlated with neither the employment size nor the number of high-tech firms outside the STIPs. These variables have positive and significant coefficients in the labor productivity function, as shown in column (5) of Tables 5 to 8 . Moreover, the coefficient on the UID is negative and significant in columns (1), (2), (4), and (5) of Table 9 , whereas it is insignificant in all the columns of Tables 5 to 8 . These contrasting results suggest that not only the on-park firms but also the high-tech firms outside the STIPs are faced with congestion, and that congestion is even more severe in cities with higher UID, i.e., more diverse industries.
These results concerning UID, together with the absence of correlation between UID and productivity, reinforce Hu's (2007) finding that there is no evidence for dynamic urbanization economies. Still it is not clear whether these results indicate that the STIPs do not need to be located in large cities, since the positive effects of urbanized economies might be reflected in the effects of foreign ventures and universities, which tend to concentrate in large cities. This issue is left to future studies.
Conclusions
Congestion is a common problem in cities across the developing world, especially those cities with industrial clusters that were formed spontaneously by firms and have been growing (e.g., Otsuka and Sonobe, 2008) . The industrial park is usually a solution to the congestion problem. In China, for example, local governments have developed numerous industrial parks to reduce the congestion caused by industries in their townships, cities, or provinces. The national STIPs are the highest grade of industrial parks in China. The analysis of this paper, however, has offered suggestive evidence that the high-tech firms in the STIPs now suffer from the negative effect of congestion on productivity. The paper has also found that the productivity of high-tech firms, whether within or outside the STIPs, is positively associated with the foreign direct investment and the academic activities of local universities in the same city.
In the presence of congestion that outweighs agglomeration economies, preferential treatment in favor of the on-park firms leads to inefficient resource allocation. In China, the preferential treatment has contributed to the growth of the STIPs by attracting a large number of firms to the STIPs. As the STIPs become overcrowded with firms, however, such a policy gives firms the wrong incentive. To alleviate the efficiency loss due to congestion, the STIPs should expel the firms that hardly generate synergistic effects and benefit little from agglomeration economies. Dependent variable is log(Y it /L it ). Year dummies and an intercept are included in the regression. The results concerning them are not reported in the table, but they will be provided upon request. Columns (3) and (6) report the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the STIP dummy and each regressor. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics in the fixed-effects models and z statistics in the random-effects models. *, **, and *** indicate the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is log(Y it /L it ). Year dummies and an intercept are included in the regression. The results concerning them are not reported in the table but will be provided upon request. Columns (3) and (6) report the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the STIP dummy and each regressor. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics in the fixed-effects models and z statistics in the random-effects models. *, **, and *** indicate the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is log(Y it /L it ). Year dummies and an intercept are included in the regression. The results concerning them are not reported in the table but will be provided upon request. Columns (3) and (6) report the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the STIP dummy and each regressor. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics in the fixed-effects models and z statistics in the random-effects models, and *, **, and *** indicate the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. Dependent variable is log(Y it /L it ). Year dummies and an intercept are included in the regression. The results concerning them are not reported in this table but will be provided upon request. Columns (3) and (6) report the estimated coefficients on the interaction of the STIP dummy and each regressor. Numbers in parentheses are t statistics in the fixed-effects models and z statistics in the random-effects models, and *, **, and *** indicate the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
